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Public exigencies have furnished occasions for laws fixing prices in
ordinary businesses. Great wars, extensive plagues, and similar calami-
ties have usually been followed by laws seeking to mitigate the resul-
tant disaster by restraining freedom of contract. Less urgent situations
have resulted in price-fixing for monopolies and public service businesses.
"Affected with a public interest"'- was the hypostasis of public regula-
tion, and prominent among the facts claimed to create a public interest
was monopoly. Lord Ellenborough was quoted in Munn v. Illinois as
follows:2
"There is no doubt that the general principle is favored, both in law
and justice, that every man may fix what price he pleases upon his own
property, or the use of it; but if for a particular purpose the public
have a right to resort to his premises and make use of them and he have
a monopoly in them for that purpose, if he will take the benefit of that
monopoly, he must, as an equivalent, perform the duty attached to it on
reasonable terms."
That the charges of businesses providing a public service, themselves
more or less monopolies; and of monopolies generally, those of law as
well as those of fact, may be regulated by law is a principle so univer-
sally accepted and so generally applied that examples need not be given.3
Regulation of business is as old as Hammurabi, and in A. D. 301
Diocletian tried price-fixing without success.4 Wars and plagues- in
England and the revolution in France furnished the motives for the
most striking examples of price-fixing for ordinary businesses.
Augustine, in the third century, argued for a Justum pretium, but his
statements were moral and religious and enforceable only by religious
sanctions, and the pious author recognized the moral and religious right
to sell a thing for its "worth." 5  At that time the Roman law left the
fixation of prices to the "higgling of the market."6  Later Saint
1De Partibus Maris (787) I Harg. L. Tr. 78; Munn. v. Illinois (1877) 94 U. S.
113; Stephens v. Central of Ga. Ry. (1912) 138 Ga. 625, 75 S. E. 1O41; 1 Watkins,
Shippers & Carriers (3d. ed. 1920) 221, 232, 233, and sec. 45, with notes.
94 U. S. at p. 127.
'Supra note I; United States v. American. Tobacco Co. (1911) 221 U. S. io6,
31 Sup. Ct. 632; Standard Oil Co. v. United States (1911) 221 U. S. I, 31 Sup. Ct.
502; Budd v. New York (1892) 143 U. S. 517, 12 Sup. Ct. 468; German A lliance
Ins. Co. v. Kansa& (1914) 233 U. S. 389, 34 Sup. Ct. 612; Address of Edgar
Watkins, University of the South, The Sewanee Review, October, igio.
'See Stephens v. Ry., supra note i; and Simon Litman, Discuission of Prices
and Price Control in Great Britain and the United States during the War (i92o),
being No. 19 of the Preliminary Economic Studies of the War in the Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace.
'1 Ashley, Introd. to English Econ. History (4th ed. 19o9) 133 et seq.
*Justinian, Digest IV, iv, 16 (4) xix, ii, 22 (3).
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Thomas Aquinas, as well as the other canonists, contended for a "just
price," but attempted no definition thereof.
England for centuries enacted laws to regulate trade. There were
assizes of wages, of beer, and of bread. Those as to beer and bread
dealt principally with standards of measurement, with weight, and with
quality, although prices were assized or fixed. There was nothing
indefinite as to the price of commodities or the rate of wages; and,
however despotic the King was, there was opportunity for the trader
or wage-earner to be heard.
Usually prices were fixed by the interested gild, by the clerks of the
market, the justices of the peace, or by the mayor and common council,
all except the gilds being aided by special juries who were acting under
specific statutory power, authorizing the holding of hearings and the
fixing of prices and wages. In all cases there was some hearing and
the price-fixers had or obtained some definite knowledge of the facts
constituting a reasonable price, and a definite price was named.
The statute of 1534 gave powers for settling the price of victuals by
authority.7 By proclamation in 1618 the King directed the "Clerke
of our Market" to "set reasonable and indifferent [i. e., non-discrimin-
atory] rates and prices upon victuals and other provisions." The times
and places of holding the court were fixed by the proclamation and the
"Clerke of our Market" was directed to make his inquiry by the oath of
"twelve men at the least to be impanelled."
A form used by the justices of the peace, showing how wages were
rated in the seventeenth century, is quoted by Cunningham.9 This in
part reads:
"At the general quarter sessions of the Peace, of our Sovereign Lord
the King, held for the County of Middlesex at Westminster in the said
county, upon .......... next after the Feast of Easter (to-wit) the
...... day of ........... in the .......... year of the reign of our
Sovereign Lord Charles the Second, by the Grace of God, King of
England, Scotland, France, and Ireland, Defender of the Faith, etc.,
the ..................... The rates df servants wages, labourers,
workmen and artificers (in pursuance of the Statute of the Fifth of
Queen Elizabeth, in that behalf made and provided) are rated and
assessed by the Justice of the Peace of the said county at the said
sessions assembled (calling to their assistance some others of the discreet
inhabitants of the said county) as hereafter followeth: ....
"And it is ordered by the said justices, that the sheriff of the said
county shall cause the said rates to be proclaimed and published
according to the statute in that case also made and provided; and that
after such proclamation and publication made of the said rates, that no
person whatsoever (which may be therein concerned) shall (this present
year) presume to give, allow, demand, receive, or take any greater
wages than such as are mentioned in the said rates; neither shall any
'William Cunningham, The Growth of English Industry and Commerce in
Modern Times (3d ed. 1903) sec. 173.
8 Ibid. 94, 95.
'Ibid. Appendix A, 887, 888.
THE LAW AND THE PROFITS
master, or mistress, entertain or put away any servant, workman, or
labourer; neither shall any servant, workman, or labourer, depart from
any master or mistress, which may be mentioned or intended in the said
Statute of the Fifth of Queen Elizabeth or any other statute in that
behalf provided, without due observation of the said statutes, under such
pains and penalties as are therein respectively mentioned."
So far as my investigation shows, the statement is justified that there
was always a hearing, a definite rate or price fixed, and a public procla-
mation thereof.
By decree in May, 1793, France augmented the evils of assignats by
the law of the "maximum" which undertook the fixation of prices.10
The common-law prohibition of engrossing, forestalling, and regrat-
ing had its basis in monopoly. "Engrossing" meant buying with intent
to resell and was made a crime in order to prevent the small farmer or
craftsman from selling to a middleman who might engross or monopo-
lize the commodity. "Forestalling" meant to go out and meet the seller
before he reached the market and buy his goods or dissuade him from
coming to the market, the effect of forestalling being similar to that of
engrossing. "Regrating" was a lesser form of engrossing, engrossing
being wholesaling, and regrating, retailing. The regrator could not
sell in the same market or within four miles thereof. These laws were
for the protection of both seller and purchaser. Some of these statutes
were repealed "as being detrimental to the supply of the laboring and
manufacturing poor of the Kingdom"; and ultimately both the common-
law and the statutory offenses were abolished.11
John Stuart Mill, summing up the history of price-fixing, said :12
". . governments have thought themselves qualified to regulate the
condition better than the persons interested. There is scarcely any
commodity which they have not at some place or time endeavored to
make either dearer or cheaper than it would be if left to itself."
Further discussing the question the learned economist concludes that
such efforts have always proven futile.
Adam Smith, after quoting Dr. Burn as saying that 40o years of trial
had shown that regulation of the prices of wages prevented "emulation"
and left no room "for industry or ingenuity," said :13
"In ancient times too it was usual to attempt to regulate the profits of
merchants .... it may perhaps be proper [where monopoly exists] ....
But where there is none, the competition will regulate it much better
than any assize."
10 See Litman, op. cit. 6, 7, 8, and Henry E. Bourne, 4aximum Prices in France,
American Historical Review, October, 1917, 107, 110. Carlyle, who was more
sympathetic than historically critical of the French Revolution, thought that the
"Maximum" and Assignats made possible whatever success there was in that Revo-
lution.
' (1772) II & 12 Geo. III, c. 71; (1884) 7 & 8 Vict., c. 24; i Bishop, Criminal
Law (8th ed. 1892) secs. 518 (2), 524 (I).
Principles of Political Economy (1848) bk. 5, ch. IO, sec. 3.
The Wealth of Nations (1776) bk. I, cl. IO.
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Englishmen emigrating to America naturally brought with them ideas
long prevalent in the land from which they came, and in John
Winthrop's Journal, instances are recorded where both courts and the
church sought to regulate prices. A merchant who "kept a shop in
Boston" was in 1639 charged with "taking above six-pence in the
shilling profit; in some eight-pence and in some small things above
'two for one and being hereof convicted he was fined 200 pounds." This
case was debated at length both before the court and the church.
Among the arguments urged against the accused was that he was
"wealthy and having but one child"; while in his favor it was set forth
that he was "liberal as in his hospitality, and in church communion."
The accused shed many tears and expressed repentance. The result was
a partial remitting of the fine and a sermon by the pastor in which the
evils of covetousness were fully proclaimed.
Among the earliest discussions in America of the legal right to fix
prices was in a case14 that involved an ordinance of Mobile, Alabama,
which, among other things, provided:
"That all bread baked should be of good and wholesome flour, and
that its weight and price should be in conformity with a proclamation,
to be issued from time to time by the mayor, regulating these matters
by a reference to the price of flour at the time of the proclamation."
Relying on English precedents the Alabama court held that such
regulation was within the police power but that.the City of Mobile was
not properly authorized to pass such an ordinance. "Affects the public
interest" and "directly affects the body of the people" are expressions
used to support the finding that the price of bread could be fixed by
appropriate legislative authority.
The Supreme Court of the United States, with vigorous dissents
accompanying eah step, has progressed gradually from the basis of
monopoly and public service businesses. The basic principles adopted
by the Supreme Court and the gradual broadening of such principles are
shown elsewhere by the author of this article.' 5
In the New York Elevator and the Kansas City Insurance casesx7
and in cases cited in the majority opinions therein, monopoly of fact,
although not definitely named and. only described, was considered as
furnishing one justification for the regulation there sustained. In the
New York Elevator case where there was a natural monopoly of fact,
Justices Brewer, Field, and Brown dissented, distinguishing between
monopolies of law and monopolies of fact. Mr. Justice Brewer force-
fully argued that a small country store might have a partial monopoly
'Mobile v. Yzdlle (1841) 3 Ala. N. s. 137, 36 Am. Dec. 441. The quotation in
the text is taken from the latter report; it does not appear in the former. See
also Guillotte v. New Orleans (1857) 12 La. Ann. 432.
15Watkins, op. cit. secs. 36 and 45, with notes.
' Budd v. New York, supra note 3.
17 German Alliance Ins. Co. v. Kansas, supra note 3.
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and said, "the magnitude of the business does not change the
principle." In the Kansas City Insurance case, where there was an arti-
ficial monopoly of fact, Mr. Chief Justice White and Justices Lamar and
Van Devanter dissented. An unusually able dissenting opinion was
written by Mr. Justice Lamar in the course of which he quoted Judge
Cooley's statement that "the right to fix prices was inconsistent with
constitutional liberty." With a foresight equal to his great legal ability,
he continued:
"There seems no escape from the conclusion that the asserted power to
fix the price to be paid by one private person to another private person
or private corporation for a private contract of indemnity, or for his
product, or his labor, or for his private contracts, of any sort, will
become the center of a circle of price-making legislation that in its
application, will destroy the right of private property, and break down
the barriers which the Constitution has thrown around the citizen to
protect him in his right of property,--which includes his right of
contract to make property,--his right to fix the price at which his
property shall be used by another."
The rent cases discussed hereinafter are but the logical corollary of
Munn v. Illinois. Mr. Justice Field clearly saw whither that case led:
"I deny the power of any Legislature under our government to fix the
price which one shall receive for his property of any kind. If the
power can be exercised as to one article, it may as in all articles, and the
prices of everything from a calico gown to a city mansion may be the
subject of legislative direction."
Mr. Justice Holmes, who never fears to follow where logic leads,
even though he may be thereby compelled to sustain legislation which,
were he legislator, he probably would disapprove, passed beyond
"affected with a public interest" and arrived at "usage," "prevailing
morality," and "preponderant opinion" as justifying regulation.
In the Noble State Bank case' 8 the power of a state to regulate the
business of banking by requiring a common guarantee of deposits was
sustained as a proper exercise of the police power, of which power,
Mr. Justice Holmes, delivering the opinion of the court, said:
"It may be said in a general way that the police power extends to all the
great public needs. Camfield v. United States, 167 U. S. 518, 42 L. Ed.
26o, 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 864. It may be put forth in aid of what is
sanctioned by usage, or held by the prevailing morality or strong and
preponderant opinion to be greatly and immediately necessary to the
public welfare."
One less intellectually courageous and honest would probably not have
expressed the principle so frankly, not to say boldly. But what shows
"public interest" more clearly than usage, prevailing and preponderant
opinions?
"'Noble State Bank v. Haskell (1911) 219 U. S. 104, 31 Sup. Ct. 186, affirming
(19o8) 22 Okla. 48, 97 Pac. 590.
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The writer fears that the language quoted opens a Pandora's box from
which may proceed dangerous economic heresies, which demagogues
and political quacks will seek to make effective in legislation; but logi-
cally there seems to be no escape from the conclusion stated by the
learned Justice.
Appropriately Mr. Justice Holmes wrote the majority opinion in the
rent-fixing cases.19 Public interest produced by "emergency" was
here relied on but the Noble State Bank case was cited. The proposi-
tion discussed was that "Circumstances have clothed the letting of
buildings . . . . with a public interest so great as to justify regulation
by law." Three sentences illustrate the method of establishing the
proposition. At page 155 the Justice said:
"Plainly circumstances may so change in time or so differ in space
as to clothe with such an interest what at other times or in other places
would be a matter of purely private concern .... They illustrate also
that the use by the public generally of each specific thing affected
cannot be made the test of public interest .... They dispel the notion
that what in its immediate aspect may be only a private transaction may
not be raised by its class or character to a public affair."
Circumstances may change and what is a public interest now may not be
next month or next year.
In a case subsequently decided, sustaining the New York rent laws,"
0
Mr. Justice Clarke in differing language applied emergency as a basis
for finding a public interest. He said:
"If this court were disposed, as it is not, to ignore the notorious fact
that a grave social problem has arisen from the insufficient supply of
dwellings in all large cities of this and other countries, resulting from
the cessation of building activities, incident to the war, nevertheless,
these reports and the very great respect which courts must give to the
legislative declaration that an emergency existed would be amply suffi-
cient to sustain an appropriate resort to the police power for the purpose
of dealing with it in the public interest."
One remote mountain store to which a community of a half a dozen
families must go for food and clothing may be "affected with a public
interest"; a small coal yard with a supply limited because of a strike
of railroad employes and coal miners may be so affected by that emer-
gency as to be a subject of regulation;. but there remains in Pandora's
box one hope: the form that the regulation takes and the manner of
enforcing it must be such as the constitution authorizes. So far at
least as the criminal provisions of price-fixing laws there must be "an
ascertainable standard of guilt"_ and the statute must be "adequate to
inform persons accused of violation thereof of the nature and cause of
" Block v. Hirsh (1921) 256 U. S. 135, 41 Sup. Ct 458; Marcus Browa Co. v.
Feldman (1921) 256 U. S. 17o, 41 Sup. Ct 465.
'Levy Leasing Co. v. Siegel (1922) 42 Sup. Ct. 289.
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the accusation against them."' 21  The rule applicable to civil rights may
be less strict,22 but even as to these rights there must be opportunity to
be heard. In a case fixing railway charges the Supreme Court has
said :23
"In the comparatively few cases in which such questions have arisen, it
has been distinctly recognized that administrative orders, quasi-judicial
in character, are void if a hearing was denied; if that granted was
inadequate or manifestly unfair; if the finding was contrary to the
'indisputable character of the evidence .... or if the facts do not as a
matter of law support the order made.'"
So far as it is a subject of legislation, "police power," it seems, is
limited only by prevailing public opinion and that opinion might justify
soviet regulation of production and distribution; but even though the
power to legislate exists, that power must be so exercised as to conform
to the constitutional right to a hearing before judgment and to a fair
trial before conviction.
This immense power for good or evil possessed by public opinion
makes necessary that such opinion should be wisely guided. To restrain
the exercise of such power might perhaps hamper the development of
mankind; perhaps the human race is not sufficiently advanced safely
to exercise such power; perhaps logic should be subject to the theory
of relativity and not be followed in a direct line to what seems a neces-
sary conclusion; but these are questions which this paper does not
attempt to answer. Doubt exists but faith and hope abide.
This article may properly close by quoting the words of two states-
men-judges. Judge Putnam, of the Circuit Court of Appeals, in
United States v. Winslow, a case later affirmed by the Supreme Court,
said :24
"We have lived in so much peace for more than a century under the
protection of the constitutional provisions to which we refer that whole
masses of citizens and some of their leaders are slumbering in reference
" United States v. Cohen Grocery Co. (1921) 255 U. S. 81, 41 Sup. Ct 298.
See brief of this writer in Oglesby Grocery Co. v. United States (1921) 255 U. S.
1o8, 41 Sup. Ct. 306, where are cited cases holding that criminal statutes must be
free of "uncertainty, vagueness and indefiniteness."
' Supra note 20. In this case the court pointed out that the decisions on the
Lever Act (Act of Aug. io, 1917, 4o Stat. at L. 276) might be different in a civil
case and said, at page 330: "The standard of the statute is as definite as the 'just
compensation' standard adopted in the 5th amendment to the Constitution, and
therefore ought to be sufficiently definite to satisfy the Constitution. Ultited States
v. L. Cohen Grocery Co., 255 U. S. 81, 65 L: Ed. 516, 14 A. L. R. 1045, 41 Sup. Ct.
Rep. 298, dealing with definitions of crime, is not applicable." The holding of the
Circuit Court of Appeals in W. H. Goff Company v. Lamborn & Co. (1922,
C. C. A. 5th) 281 Fed. 613 is contrary to the implication in the language quoted
above from the opinion of Mr. justice Clarke.
= 2 Watldns, op. cit. sec. 316 and note 127, where are cited other similar deci-
sions of the Supreme Court
21 (1912, D. Mass.) 195 Fed. 578, 587.
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to them, while our forefathers who were brought into almost immediate
contact with all the devices to which tyranny was accustomed, were
fully awake. The courts, however, are not permitted to slumber."
In Ex Parte Jackson, Judge Bourquin said :25
"The inalienable rights of personal security and safety, orderly and due
process of law, are fundamentals of the social compact, the basis of
organized society, the essence and justification of government, the
foundation, key, and capstones of the Constitution. They are limited
to no man, race, or nation, to no time, place or occasion, but belong to
man, always, everywhere, and in all circumstances. Every nation
demands them for its people from all other nations. No emergency in
war or peace warrants their violation, for in emergency, real, or
assumed, tyrants in all ages have found excuse for their destruction.
Without them democracy perishes, autocracy reigns, and the innocent
suffer with the guilty. Without them is no safety, peace, content,
happiness, and they must be vindicated, defended and maintained in the
face of every assault by government, or otherwise."
(192o, D. Mont) 263 Fed. 110, 113.
